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General

manage-secrets

>- 1Password-based secret storage workflow: vault layout, 1p:// references in .envrc, op run for local execution. Use when storing or rotating credentials with 1Password. (Other backends not covered.)

manage-secrets

Secrets with 1Password

Philosophy

Secrets never sit in plaintext in the repo, in shell history, or in long-lived shell env. 1Password is the only source of truth. Files commit references (op://vault/item/field); resolution happens at command time, in the child process only, via op run or op inject. Scanning and leak response stay in [[audit-security]]; this skill owns the storage and injection workflow.

Prerequisites

op --version             # CLI present (installed via Brewfile: cask "1password-cli")
op whoami                # signed in; if not: `op signin` (or unlock via the 1Password desktop app)
op vault list            # confirm the target vault exists

The 1Password desktop app unlocks biometric integration and enables the op shell plugins (op plugin init aws|gh|...). For headless / CI, use a service account token instead (see CI section).

The reference format

op://<vault>/<item>/[<section>/]<field>

Examples: op://Dev/aws/access_key_id, op://Dev/snowflake/credentials/password. Vaults and items can be addressed by name or UUID; UUIDs survive renames and are preferred in committed files for projects with churn.

Store a secret

For ad-hoc storage, prefer creating a typed item over stashing things in a Secure Note (typed items get the right field names, masking, and shell-plugin support):

# API token / opaque credential
op item create --vault Dev --category "API Credential" --title myservice \
  credential="$(pbpaste)"                      # never type the value on the command line

# Login (username + password + URL)
op item create --vault Dev --category login --title github-bot \
  username=ci-bot password=- url=https://github.com    # `=-` reads value from stdin

# Add or update a field on an existing item
op item edit myservice --vault Dev "credential[concealed]=$(pbpaste)"

After creation, get the reference (do not echo the value):

op item get myservice --vault Dev --format json | jq -r '.fields[] | "\(.label) -> op://Dev/myservice/\(.id)"'

Never paste a secret value as a literal argument. Use =- to read from stdin, or $(pbpaste) immediately after copying from 1Password, so the value does not enter shell history. Pair with setopt HIST_IGNORE_SPACE and prefix the command with a space when in doubt.

Migrate a project off plaintext secrets

When you find committed secrets (or a plaintext .env):

  1. Scan first (delegated to [[audit-security]]): gitleaks detect --no-banner.

  2. For each finding, store the value in 1Password (typed item, correct vault), then replace the plaintext in the file with its op:// reference:

    - AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=AKIA...
    - AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=wJalrXUt...
    + AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=op://Dev/aws/access_key_id
    + AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=op://Dev/aws/secret_access_key
  3. Rotate every secret that was ever committed. A reference in the current file does not undo the past leak. Rotation is mandatory, not optional.

  4. Decide what stays gitignored. A .env containing only op:// references is safe to commit and helps onboarding. A .env with any plaintext stays gitignored (.gitignore: .env, .env.local, *.pem, *.key).

  5. Verify the new file resolves end-to-end:

    op run --env-file=.env -- env | grep -E 'AWS_|DB_' | sed 's/=.*/=<resolved>/'

Run commands with secrets injected

The default for invoking any command that needs secrets:

op run --env-file=.env -- <command>

op run resolves op:// refs in the env file, exports them to the child process only, and masks them in stdout/stderr by default. Examples:

op run --env-file=.env -- terraform apply
op run --env-file=.env -- pytest -q
op run --env-file=.env -- node scripts/migrate.js

For a single secret without a file: op read "op://Dev/aws/access_key_id". Prefer op run over op read | export because op read puts the value in the shell’s environment (and potentially history) for the rest of the session.

Config files with embedded refs

For YAML/JSON/INI/dotfile templates that need secrets baked in (a generated config, a kubeconfig, a ~/.npmrc), use op inject:

# template.yaml contains:  password: "{{ op://Dev/db/password }}"
op inject -i template.yaml -o config.yaml
chmod 600 config.yaml

Add the resolved output to .gitignore. Re-run op inject whenever the template changes; never edit the resolved file directly.

direnv

direnv is for non-secret, per-project shell config (paths, profile names, flags). See [[setup-devenv]] for the .envrc patterns. Do not put op read into .envrc: it resolves at cd time, caches the secret in the shell session, and defeats the point. Pattern:

# .envrc -- non-secret config only
export APP_ENV=development
export AWS_PROFILE=dev
PATH_add bin

# .env -- op:// refs only, run via:  op run --env-file=.env -- <cmd>

If a command needs both direnv’d config and resolved secrets, wrap it:

# bin/dev (project-local, on PATH via PATH_add bin)
#!/usr/bin/env bash
exec op run --env-file=.env -- "$@"

Then dev terraform apply does the right thing.

CI / non-interactive

GitHub Actions: use 1password/load-secrets-action@v2 with a service account token stored as OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN in the repository’s GitHub Actions secrets. Map each needed op:// ref to a job-scoped env var; never echo the resolved values, never set continue-on-error on the load step. For other CI providers, set OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN and run op run/op read the same way as locally.

Safety rules

  • Never echo, log, or print resolved secrets. Not even partially. Mask before logging (sed 's/=.*/=<redacted>/').
  • Never bake resolved values into committed files. Only op:// references.
  • Always rotate a secret that ever existed as plaintext in git history, even briefly. A force-push does not erase forks, clones, or caches.
  • Prefer typed items (API Credential, Login, Database) over Secure Notes so fields are masked, structured, and discoverable via shell plugins.
  • One vault per trust boundary (Dev, Prod, Shared, Personal). Do not store prod secrets in the Dev vault to save a click.
  • For leak scanning, response, and .gitignore hygiene, see [[audit-security]].